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ABSTRACT 
Test chips built in a 32nm bulk CMOS technology consisting of 
hardened and non-hardened sequential elements have been exposed 
to neutrons, protons, alpha-particles and heavy ions. The radiation 
robustness of two types of circuit-level soft error mitigation tech-
niques has been tested: 1) SEUT (Single Event Upset Tolerant), an 
interlocked, redundant state technique, and 2) a novel hardening 
technique referred to as RCC (Reinforcing Charge Collection). This 
work summarizes the measured soft error rate benefits and design 
tradeoffs involved in the implemented hardening techniques. 
Neutron; Alpha particle; neutron; proton; heavy ion; space; 
terrestrial; single event effects; SEE; soft errors; SE; 
hardened;mitigation 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Ionizing radiation is known to cause noise bursts in silicon (Si) 
substrates of modern integrated circuits (ICs) [1-3]. If the amount of 
charge collected at reverse-biased junctions is larger than the so-
called critical charge (Qcrit), an upset occurs [4]. Due to the relative-
ly low flux rates in the radiation environments of interest in this 
work, faults are induced by single particles and all radiation induced 
phenomena are referred to as single event effects (SEE). In memory 
type cells radiation-induced faults are called single event upsets 
(SEU). SEUs are stable in time until the upset devices are re-written. 
An entirely different class of radiation-induced faults is formed by 
single event transients (SETs). SETs occur in static combinational 
logic where the node voltage is always restored in the case of a par-
ticle strike. Radiation induced glitches per se do not result in errors 
on the chip or system level until the glitch is captured by a receiving 
storage element [5]. SETs in clock networks are discussed in refer-
ence [6].  
More than 95% of all upsets at sea-level are either due to a) high-
energy neutrons, or b) alpha particles emitted from radioactive iso-
topes located within ~50μm of the active Si surface [3, 7]. In con-
trast, soft error upsets in a space environment mainly result from a) 
protons trapped in belts by earth’s magnetosphere in the case of low 
earth orbits, and b) heavy ions in geosynchronous orbits. For a de-
tailed description of the different radiation environments, please see 
reference [8].  
Neutrons and high energy protons, in contrast to alpha particles or 
heavy ions, do not directly ionize Si but generate electron hole pairs 
via secondary ions that are created in nuclear reactions [2, 9]. There 
are two classes of nuclear collisions: elastic and inelastic scattering. 
In most elastic events, only a small amount of energy is transferred 
onto the target nucleus, which recoils but does not change its intrin-
sic energy state. In case of an inelastic event, secondary protons, 
neutrons, and pions are produced, and an excited intermediate nuc-
leus is formed. This nucleus subsequently de-excites by the emission 
of other secondary particles, and it is finally transformed into a stable 
and lighter residual nucleus. The secondary fragments from the 
second reaction stage consist of protons, neutrons, light ions, and 
heavy residual nuclei. The heavy recoiling nuclei typically deposit a 
large amount of charge in a small volume, whereas the secondary 
light fragments deposit charge over path lengths that are large com-
pared to typical device dimensions. Low-energy secondary protons 
deposit appreciable ionization energies (per unit track length) in the 
Si substrate. For modern technologies, characterized by low Qcrit 
values, these low energy protons might be a significant contributor to 
device upset rates through direct ionization rather than nuclear reac-
tions [10]. 
If the radiation event deposits sufficient charge, more than a sin-
gle device or bit may be affected, creating a so-called multi-cell up-
sets (MCU) as opposed to a single bit upsets (SBU) [11]. Technology 
scaling is known to increase the fraction of MCU clusters dramatical-
ly, with important implications for future memory architectures in 
systems utilizing error correction codes (ECC). Recent studies have 
demonstrated the increased sensitivity of memory type devices in the 
presence of MCU and charge sharing1 for various radiation environ-
ments [11, 12, 13].  
Most published SER trend data are for terrestrial environments. 
However, there is no reason why similar trends should not be ex-
pected for space applications. With process scaling, most authors 
agree that the total SER/bit is decreasing for SRAM devices [11, 14, 
15, 16]. Because most SRAM arrays are nowadays protected, SRAM 
trends are becoming of lesser importance. This is in contrast to ran-
dom logic, which is much more difficult and expensive to protect 
[17, 18]. No industry-wide agreement seems to exist for logic devic-
es [3, 19, 20]. However, to the best of our knowledge, logic SER on 
the chip-level is expected to increase per generation if no additional 
mitigation techniques are implemented. MCU rates show an expo-
nential increase with process scaling [11].  
In a recent publication it was speculated that the return on in-
vestment of some popular design mitigation techniques that rely on 
separation in space, such as interleaving in memory arrays, or har-
dened devices utilizing local redundancy, might suffer greatly with 
continued process scaling [21]. For older technologies conventional 
radiation-hardened-by-design (RHBD) approaches such as Dual 
Interlocked Cell (DICE), Built-in Soft Error Resilience (BISER), 
Single Event Upset Tolerant (SEUT) or Triple Modular Redundancy 
designs (TMR) provide excellent protection against SEU [22, 23, 24, 
25]. With technology scaling, charge collection at multiple nodes due 
to a single particle strike is becoming more probable. One of the key 
objectives of our work is to measure and characterize the SER bene-
fit of mitigation techniques that rely on hardening by redundancy. To 
quantify the impact of scaling, the authors designed and implemented 
hardened devices with different minimum node separation design 
                                                                 
1 The term charge sharing is somewhat misleading. It denotes collec-
tion of charge by two or more nodes (within the same or different 
cells) due to the one particle strike (i.e., one single event). 
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 rules on two test chips. The implemented and tested mitigation tech-
nique is SEUT [24]. However, the learning gained by this study is 
expected to be applicable to any circuit-level mitigation scheme that 
relies on separation in space of redundant state nodes. Experimental 
SER results for various radiation environments are presented. Anoth-
er key objective of this work is to introduce and characterize the soft 
error sensitivity of a novel circuit level mitigation technique called 
RCC (Reinforcing Charge Collection). RCC promises very low pow-
er and area overheads at sufficiently low upset rates and most impor-
tantly is expected to show better technology scaling properties than 
redundancy based techniques.  
 
TEST CHIP DESIGNS 
Two different soft error (SE) test chips have been designed and 
built in a 32nm CMOS bulk technology. Each test chip (TC) contains 
thousands of instantiations of several flavors of sequential elements 
each, all chained together in a shift register fashion [24]. All relevant 
elements are briefly summarized in Table 1. 
TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF TEST CHIPS AND IMPLEMENTED SEQUENTIAL 
DESIGNS. 
Test 
Chip 
Sequential 
Design 
Description 
TC1 Ref. Latch Standard library reference latch 
SEUT800 SEUT latch with sensitive diffusion separa-
tion of about 800nm 
SEUT150 SEUT latch with sensitive diffusion separa-
tion of about 150nm 
RCC2 RCC latch with sensitive diffusion separation 
of 5 poly widths 
RCC1 RCC latch with one poly width diffusion 
separation 
TC2 SEUT800 SEUT latch with sensitive diffusion separa-
tion of about 800nm 
SEUT600 SEUT latch with sensitive diffusion separa-
tion of about 600nm 
SEUT400 SEUT latch with sensitive diffusion separa-
tion of 400nm 
SEUT150 SEUT latch with sensitive diffusion separa-
tion of about 150nm 
 
In the following sections, upset modes and key properties of each 
investigated design style (SEUT and RCC) will be explained.  
Local Redundancy Hardened Designs 
Many redundancy based hardened designs have been published 
and tested [22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30]. Formal design and analysis 
techniques have also been developed for SEU immune circuits [31, 
32]. Most designs are single error correcting circuits except BISER 
[23]—which is an error blocking design. Single error correcting de-
signs, such as SEUT [24, 30], recover upsets to a correct state after 
radiation induced pulse is removed without waiting for the next clock 
signal. Error blocking designs use two redundant memory elements 
and add error blocking logic at the output to block error propagation. 
BISER reuses scan circuits as redundant memory to reduce area and 
power penalties and a C-element at the output to block error propaga-
tion. SEUT and BISER devices as well as other redundancy based 
hardened designs such as TMR are expected to show very similar 
radiation properties and dependencies on circuit parameters such as 
critical state node separation, critical charge and diffusion areas [21].  
Redundancy based hardened designs discussed in this work can 
only recover strikes when charge is collected by one node (with the 
exception of clock node strikes, see below). It is very important to 
separate “critical nodes” in space to minimize the amount of charge 
collected at those sensitive nodes. Therefore, SER reduction is 
strongly dependent on critical node spacing. The farther critical  
nodes are separated, the higher the SER reduction (see below). The 
flipside of larger spacing is larger cell areas. Hence, trade-offs must 
be made to balance SER reduction and cell area growth. Technology 
scaling reduces spacing by about ~0.7x each generation. This impos-
es a big challenge on hardened circuit design for current and future 
generation designs.  
A second major upset mechanism of hardened sequential ele-
ments is clock node strikes [16]. Please note that this upset mechan-
ism does not involve charge collection at more than one node and 
therefore can be a significant SER contributor. In principle one can 
distinguish two modes of clock node upsets [6]: a) Radiation-induced 
race which reflects a false opening of the receiving sequential and 
data racing through it. For non-critical paths this mode is the domi-
nating clock node upset mechanism. b) Radiation-induced clock 
jitter, where the clock edge is shifted by the particle strike such that 
for critical paths, data will not be latched correctly. Due to the very 
slow clock speeds applied in our experiments, our shift register test 
chips were not sensitive to radiation-induced jitter. 
Finally, for non error blocking schemes and strikes that yield 
transient glitches (SETs) only, pulses could propagate to downstream 
logic and could potentially be latched by downstream sequential 
elements—similar to other forms of noise in combinational logic. 
This soft error contributor of hardened sequential elements is diffi-
cult to quantify (by simulation or measurements), but nevertheless 
might become an important SER contributor in future technologies. 
However, our test chips are not sensitive to this upset mode due to 
the implemented design and test methodology. 
The core design of all tested local redundancy hardened cells is 
the storage element shown in Figure 1, which replaces the classical 
cross-coupled inverter non-hardened memory element. The fully 
interrupted SEUT circuit features redundant data signals (d0 and d2) 
to reduce the overall cell SER2. During a normal write operation, 
clock is high and input passgates are on. The transistors controlled by 
clock inputs to SEUT are off. Data is written into SEUT inputs d0 
and d2 which controls qp2, qn2, qp5 and qn5 setting states d1 and d3 
correctly.  
                                                                 
2 Another option to reduce SER would be to protect clock nodes by 
implementing redundant clocks. 
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Qcrit simulation results and a SER model of SEUT (and other lo-
cal redundancy hardened designs) have been introduced and dis-
cussed in reference [21]. In the following, key findings are briefly 
summarized (see Figure 2).  
The key innovation that differentiates the hardened circuit-level 
simulation methodology from traditional ones is that not one but two 
(or more) current sources are attached to the nodes that are simulta-
neously collecting charge [21]. One has to differentiate between 
charge collection at the primary and secondary nodes3: Qcrit of the 
primary node is simulated by iterating the collected charge at the 
primary node as a function of charge collected at the secondary node 
Qs until the circuit fails. Two distinct regions can be observed. At 
low Qs values Qcrit initially decreases steeply with increasing Qs. 
Therefore a Qs threshold exists below which the primary node can-
not be upset, independent on how much charge is collected on the 
secondary node. In other words, a minimum amount of charge needs 
to be collected at the electrically coupled secondary node, or the 
device cannot be upset by charge sharing. The soft error rate under 
charge sharing conditions SERCS then equals the integral over the 
product of the SBU soft error rate SER(Qcritp(Qs(x)) at the primary 
node p with P(Qs(x)|Qcrit(Qs(x))) [21, 33] 
∫
∞
∝
0 ssp
sPs
CS (x))dQ(QSER(Qcrit
*(x)))(QQcrit|(x)P(Q
x)s,p,(SER
  (1)
 
P(Qs(x)|Qcrit(Qs(x)))dQs4 denotes the conditional probability 
that charge Q in the interval [Qs, Qs+dQs] is collected at the second-
ary node, given that Qcrit or more is collected at the primary node 
due to the same single event. The probability P(Qs(x)|Qcrit(Qs(x))) 
decreases steeply with node (actually diffusion) separation (x) which 
can be determined from layout [21]. The integrand in equation (1) 
P*SER contributes significantly only in a small Qs range due to the 
Qs dependence of P and the Qcrit(Qs) dependence of SER (see Fig-
ure 2) [21].   
                                                                 
3 Amusan calls the two charge collecting nodes active and passive 
[13]. 
4 Old terminology is P(Q,x,A). Diffusion area dependence is dropped 
here for better readability. 
 
 
Reinforcing Charge Collection (RCC) Design 
RCC is best explained using a static storage element, typically 
consisting of a pair of cross-coupled inverters. In each inverter, the 
OFF device’s diffusion (referred to as victim diffusion) is vulnerable 
to collecting ionizing-particle-induced charge that can disrupt the 
stored state. The ON device’s diffusion5 (referred here as reinforcing 
diffusion), on the other hand, collects charge that reinforces the 
stored state (in the case of the RCC design at least). If the charge 
generated by a particle strike can be collected in both the victim and 
reinforcing diffusions (charge sharing), the critical charge (Qcrit) 
needed to upset the stored state can be increased, thus reducing SER.  
 
 
The victim diffusion is fully reverse biased making it an efficient 
collector of the particle-induced charge. The reinforcing diffusion 
initially has no externally applied reverse bias, but has only the built-
in potential, making it a weak collector.  However, even this weak 
collection serves to increase Qcrit [34]. Furthermore, once the victim 
diffusion begins collecting charge the electric field across the victim 
diffusion’s depletion region quickly collapses [25]. Simultaneously, 
since the reverse bias across the reinforcing diffusion increases, its 
depletion region widens and the charge collection efficiency increas-
                                                                 
5 I.e., ON during normal circuit operation when the particle strike 
occurs. In general charge collection that occurs simultaneously can 
be reinforcing or weakening. Both, victim and reinforcing diffusions 
can be primary or secondary nodes. 
FIGURE 3.  RCC SCHEMATIC 
FIGURE 2.  SEUT QCRIT AND P(Q,X,A) VS QS [21]  
FIGURE 1.  SEUT STORAGE CELL [24, 30] 
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 es. In modern day circuits, these field fluctuations occur in pico-
second time scales. Therefore, charge collection in victim and rein-
forcing nodes is a highly dynamic process that requires mixed-mode 
device simulations to correctly model. Kawakami et al. [34] have 
published such simulations, and have shown the increase in Qcrit 
theorized here. However, they did not do these simulations in the 
context of radiation hardening. In this work, cells were specifically 
designed to maximize charge sharing, and Si test structures were 
used to show its effectiveness. 
In order for charge sharing to occur, the victim and reinforcing 
nodes need to be physically close to each other (see equation 2 be-
low). Typical layout of these cross-coupled structures might already 
have these nodes physically close to each other. However, test struc-
ture measurements show that if these nodes are within a minimum 
design rule dimension of each other, the closer proximity leads to a 
dramatic SER reduction. In this work, “dummy” gates (OFF transis-
tors) have been used to bring the diffusions of the same type within 
one poly dimension. This greatly increases the probability that 
charge generated by a particle will be collected by both diffusions, 
thus reducing SER. Introduction of the dummy gates does cost lea-
kage power. In addition, storage node capacitance and area will in-
crease in most cases, since there is less opportunity for diffusion 
sharing in layout. This costs dynamic power. The impact of increased 
capacitance and area on SER can be simulated [36], and is shown 
later in Tables 3 and 5. Figure 3 is a RCC latch schematic that shows 
two pairs of dummy devices that are OFF, and whose sole purpose is 
to minimize victim-to-reinforcing diffusion separation. One pair 
allows charge sharing between victim and reinforcing diffusions of 
the cross-coupled inverters. The other pair allows charge sharing 
between the input pass gate diffusion and its complement node. The 
layout stick diagram for such an arrangement is shown in Figure 4. 
Only the N diffusions are shown; P diffusions have a similar ar-
rangement. 
vss n2n1 vssn2 vssn3 n4clkn1n2 vssn1vss
Feedforward
Inverter (FF1)
Feedback Tristate
Inverter (FB1)
PassGate (PG)
Dummy Gate (DN1) Dummy Gate (DN2)
 
 
A test chip with the latch shown in Figure 3 was built in a 32nm 
technology (TC1; Table 1). The separation between victim and rein-
forcing nodes is one poly width for this cell. A cell with no dummy 
gates was also placed on the test chip. The minimum separation be-
tween victim and reinforcing nodes is increased in this version due to 
standard layout techniques that incorporate a shared power diffusion 
between critical diffusions (RCC2 in Table 1). The control latch has 
the same size devices as both RCC flavors implemented on TC1. 
The SER of non-redundancy hardened devices under charge shar-
ing conditions (CS), for nodes p (primary) and s (secondary) is given 
by [33] 
∫∞ ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∝
=Δ
Δ+=
0
s
P
sp
sPs
CS
CSPCS
dQ
(0))Qcrit(SER
-(x))(QSER(Qcrit
*(x)))(QQcrit|(x)P(Q
x)s,p,(SER
SER(0))Qcrit(SER)sp,(SER
 (2)
 
where SER denotes the nominal soft error rate when charge shar-
ing is ignored and ΔSERCS the correction term in the presence of 
charge sharing. Symbols have the same meanings as in the previous 
section. Qcrit (0) denotes the critical charge of the primary node if 
only the primary node collects charge.  It is important to realize that 
ΔSERCS can be positive or negative depending on the node distances 
(x), states involved and diffusion types. P(Qs(x)|Qcrit(Qs(x))) is a 
steeply decreasing function with increasing Qs(x) and hence with 
increasing x. In the case of redundancy hardened devices the main 
design objective is to reduce SER by maximizing the separation (x) 
of nodes that increase Qcrit if simultaneous charge collection oc-
curs6. In contrast, the key mitigation concept behind RCC devices is 
to minimize distances of diffusions of nodes that reinforce the stored 
state if charge is collected simultaneously.  
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There are, however, nodes that need to be kept separated even in 
the RCC design. For instance, N-N strikes (denoting NMOS strikes 
in the case of charge collecting nodes n1 and n2) result in an increase 
in critical charges and a correspondingly decrease in SER (solid line 
in Figure 5). N-P strikes in the same inverter can also decrease SER. 
In contrast, N-P strikes (denoting strikes where charge is collected in 
the OFF NMOS on one side and the OFF PMOS on the other side) 
results in an increase in SER (dashed line in Figure 5). For N-N 
strikes, one might wonder how it is possible that NMOS diffusions 
on both sides of the cross-coupled inverter collect charge simulta-
neously. One of the NMOS must be ON, and the junction therefore is 
not reversed biased. As explained earlier, the assumption behind 
equation (2) is that the radiation induced SET propagates turning off 
the NMOS on the other side allowing charge to be collected there 
efficiently during this time period. Logic in modern technologies is 
sufficiently fast and SETs sufficiently wide such that both NMOS on 
either side of the cross-coupled devices are reversed biased and 
charge is temporarily collected at nearly the same time. However, 
both devices are not off for equal lengths in time and equation (2) 
still needs to be adjusted and fitted to experimental or simulation 
data. 
                                                                 
6 The RCC concept can be combined with local redundancy schemes 
such as the one implemented in SEUT to achieve even better SER 
performance levels. 
FIGURE 5.  SIMULATED CRITICAL CHARGES OF A NON-
HARDENED LATCH IN THE PRESENCE OF CHARGE SHAR-
ING BETWEEN NODES N1 AND N2.  
FIGURE 4.  RCC LAYOUT DIAGRAM FOR N DIFFUSIONS
IRPS10-191 3A.1.4
  
EXPERIMENTAL SETUP  
Logic test vehicles built in a 32nm high-k + metal gate process 
[35] have been exposed to neutron, proton, alpha-particle and heavy 
ion radiation. The sensitivity of the test structures to alpha-particle 
radiation was studied by placing Thorium-232 foils on the wire 
bonded test chips described above. Neutron SER data were collected 
at the Los Alamos Laboratory Weapons Neutrons Research (WNR) 
facility, New Mexico (see Figure 6 for typical setup). Proton and 
heavy-ion irradiation experiments were conducted at the Indiana 
University Cyclotron facility (IUCF) and Texas A&M University 
facility, respectively. The investigated proton energy range was 27 – 
200MeV. Parts were exposed to heavy-ion beams with linear energy 
transfer (LET) values ranging from 2.8 to 71 MeV/(mg/cm2). 
Neutron beam 
entrance
Logic Test Chip 
boards
 
 
Each of the test chip designs is based on shift register topology 
and contains 3 inputs: Din, ClkA, ClkB and one output Dout. Each 
shift register consists of two identical latches: master and slave. The 
clock input of all of the master latches on a chip is connected to 
ClkA and similarly, all of the slave latches clock input is connected 
to ClkB7. In order to write a desired test pattern on a chip such as all 
ones, all zeros, checkerboard, etc, the Din signal is set to appropriate 
value (i.e. either 0 or 1) and a pulse on ClkA is applied followed by 
non-overlapping pulse on ClkB. Thus, writing a checkerboard test 
pattern (10101010…) to shift registers will result in writing 
110011001100….sequence in latches of the chip. It is not possible to 
read both master and slave latches during one experimental run in 
this design. To read out the data from all the slave latches, a pulse on 
ClkA is applied followed by non-overlapping pulse on ClkB and data 
is captured from Dout output pin. Similarly, to read data from all 
master latches, a pulse on ClkB is applied followed by a non-
overlapping pulse on ClkA.  
Our test chips can be operated in two testing modes. In mode 1 
devices are sensitive to charge sharing induced upsets only and in 
mode 2 they are sensitive to clock node strikes as well as to upsets 
induced by charge sharing. The test condition for charge sharing 
experiments is to have same polarity data stored in the latch as well 
as at the input pin of the latch. A required test condition for clock 
nodes strikes is that the data stored inside the latch should be of op-
posite polarity of the data at the input pin of the latch. The clock 
node sensitive SER testing is done by writing a checkerboard pattern, 
                                                                 
7 Two non overlapping clocks to eliminate the risk of race 
stopping the clock during the pre-defined exposure time, and after 
stopping the beam shifting out the content stored in master latches. 
The charge sharing testing is done by writing checkerboard pattern, 
waiting for exposure time, and reading out data from slave latches. 
 
DESIGN TRADEOFFS 
The SEUT based hardened cells are subjected to the same strict 
timing, area and power constraints as non-hardened designs.  The 
design goal is to minimize timing arc changes, while minimizing the 
increase of area and power compared to the non-hardened cells. We 
have studied a wide range of SEUT drive strengths and the results of 
this study are summarized below. Please note that Table 2 only lists 
overheads for devices implemented in TC1 and TC2. 
More than 95% setup and clock to out timing arcs of SEUT based 
cells meet the design target with average of 13% setup time degrada-
tion and 3.6% clock to out delay degradation.  Only about 3.6% of 
the arcs are above the targeted margin. A substantial increase in 
routing and a corresponding increase in gate and diffusion capacit-
ance make it prohibitively expensive to further power up the cell to 
bring the arcs below the allowed threshold.   
The active power is estimated to increase from 40% to 150% de-
pending on drive strength and averages at about 100%. Power con-
sumption could be lower if the timing requirement is more relaxed.  
In general, smaller drive strength cells incur a higher percentage 
power increase. The main reason is that devices in small non-
hardened cells are already close to minimum device size.  Thus, de-
vice sizes are almost double in hardened cells to create redundant 
paths. In larger cells, devices could simply be split between two re-
dundant paths. For the similar reasons, clock power increase is 
slightly higher than data power increase in terms of percentage.  
The overall area overhead ranges from 50% to 180% with aver-
ages at about 100%. In general, an increase in overhead can be ob-
served with decreasing drive strengths. As mentioned earlier and 
demonstrated experimentally in the next section, sufficient diffusion 
separation is crucial to achieving low SEU rates. However, increas-
ing critical diffusion spacing implies cell area growth. All critical 
diffusions are identified through formal analysis of SEUT circuit 
operation and verified with circuit simulations. Shown in Table 2 are 
area, power and timing overheads of a typical small drive strength 
SEUT latch implemented in TC1 and TC2 as compared to the non-
hardened control latch of the same drive strength.  Also shown are 
the overheads for an RCC1 latch as compared to the TC1 reference 
latch of same drive strength. 
TABLE 2 AREA, POWER AND TIMING OVERHEAD RESULTS: HAR-
DENED COMPARED TO NON-HARDENED CELLS:  
 
Device Area 
Active 
Power Delay Setup 
Small drive 
strength 
SEUT latch +120% +114% +4.9% +11% 
RCC1 +10% +28% +6.4% +19% 
 
The RCC layout technique results in modest area increases. Large 
cells, such as flip-flops with scan, see smaller area increases than 
small cells, such as a 1-read/1-write 8T register file cell. Modest 
power increases are also incurred due to increased diffusion capacit-
FIGURE 6.  TYPICAL EXPERIMENTAL SETUP DURING 
ACCELERATED NEUTRON SEU TESTING IN THE ICE 
HOUSE AT WNR [21]. 
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 ance and interconnect capacitance. Similarly, the timing penalties are 
also relatively small. The power and timing estimates shown in Table 
2 are based on layout extracted capacitances. 
 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In this section measured relative upset rates of tested SEUT and 
RCC devices with respect to the TC1 non-hardened reference design 
are presented and discussed for terrestrial and space radiation envi-
ronments. SEUT and RCC SER ratios were computed by dividing 
the measured upset rates or cross sections with corresponding ones 
measured for the TC1 reference latch at the same conditions (voltage, 
particle energy, etc), i.e. 
latch reference
SEUT/RCC
SEUT/RCC SER
SER
Ratio-SER =
  (3)
 
Unless explicitly mentioned, data were collected under charge 
sharing conditions (not sensitive to clock node strikes) and with 
beams at normal incidence to the chips. 
Cosmic Ray Testing Results 
Despite the fact that in our typical experimental setup tens of test 
chips each with tens of thousands of hardened and non-hardened 
devices are daisy chained together, only very few upsets are detected 
in a typical run that can last several days at a white neutron beam 
facility such as WNR8. High-energy proton facilities (such as IUCF) 
are much more accessible than white neutron facilities and usually 
offer much higher particle beam fluxes. A good correlation between 
white neutron beam and high-energy proton SER results is therefore 
of great importance for accurate hardened device characterization 
and SER modeling purposes.  The authors of this publication have 
tested several hardened test chips over the last few years and exposed 
them to high-energy proton and white neutron beams and in most 
cases observed a very good correlation. In particular for all SEUT 
devices reported in this work the correlation was excellent (all within 
error bars9) as illustrated in Figure 7 which compares high-energy 
proton (198MeV) and neutron (WNR) results for TC1 SEUT devices 
as a function of critical node separation. 
 
                                                                 
8 Strictly speaking, a white beam contains all energies at equal inten-
sity. The WNR beam spectrum does not but matches that of atmos-
pheric neutrons at sea-level. For the purposes of this paper, we con-
tinue to refer to the WNR beam as “white” 
9 All error bars in this publication denote 90% confidence levels 
assuming Poisson statistics 
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The fact that relative upset rates under high-energy proton and 
white neutron beams correlate is not surprising. We have reported in 
previous studies that for instance multi-cell upset (MCU) probabili-
ties and trends of 45nm SRAMs agree as well [11]. At low proton 
energies MCU probabilities [11] and upset rates of SEUT devices 
(Figure 8) start deviating from high-energy proton and consequently 
from WNR neutron beam results. The physical interpretation is that, 
on average, the charge cloud generated by secondary particles 
formed in nuclear proton or neutron target nuclei (mainly Si) reac-
tions is larger at higher incident proton or neutron energies. It also 
indicates that the WNR neutron beam upset cross sections for MCU 
and upsetting hardened SEUT devices is dominated by high-energy 
neutrons.  
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Data depicted in Figures 7-9 underline the exponential depen-
dence of the relative SER performance of SEUT devices on critical 
node separation. As discussed in the design tradeoffs section, SEUT 
devices with relaxed node separation requirements have somewhat 
better power and area performance numbers and so a balance be-
tween reliability performance and cost can be struck.  
FIGURE 8.  SER PROTON E-DEPENDENCE ON NODE 
SEPARATION FOR TC2 SEUT STRUCTURES AT 1V. 
FIGURE 7.  RELATIVE SER PERFORMANCE OF SEUT 
DEVICES AS A FUNCTION OF NODE SEPARATION UNDER  
198MEV P+ AND WNR NEUTRON BEAM IRRADIATION 
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All tested SEUT devices tested  in this work show a low suscepti-
bility to clock node upsets when compared to results quoted for 
SEUT 45nm designs reported in reference [21] (Figure 9). Even for 
SEUT800 devices, upset rates measured in charge sharing and charge 
sharing plus clock node SER testing modes are within error bars. 
One explanation might be that the N to P separations of diffusions 
located on the same clock buffers are significantly smaller in devices 
built in the 32nm technology than in the previously reported ones 
that were built in a 45nm process. Charge collected on N and P de-
vices in the same inverter along data- or clock paths have a similar 
impact on SER as the layout placement of the same diffusion type 
(N-N or P-P) of cross-coupled inverters in memory type cell. This is 
consistent with data collected on 32nm test chips not discussed in 
this work [38].   
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SER benefits diminish with reduced power supply voltages for 
SEUT (Figure 10)10 and RCC (Table 3) devices. Less charge (lower 
Qcrit at lower voltages) has a higher probability to be collected over 
larger distances [19] and therefore larger node separations of state 
weakening diffusions would be needed in both cases, SEUT and 
RCC, for iso-performance. 
High energy proton-induced upset rates and neutron beam results 
also correlate for RCC type devices (Table 3). However, in the case 
of RCC1 the measured SER benefit was consistently higher for neu-
tron beam testing. The authors of this work speculate that with only 
                                                                 
10 Error bars have been omitted in figure 10 to improve readability. 
Error bars are of the same order of magnitude as shown in Figure 9. 
one poly width separation between state reinforcing diffusions, even 
low energy reaction products generated by low-energy neutrons de-
posit sufficient charge to increase Qcrit and reduce the SER suscep-
tibility of RCC1 devices (upper line in Figure 5). In contrast, only 
high-energy protons or neutrons generate charge clouds large enough 
to result in sufficient simultaneous charge collection at state weaken-
ing diffusions that lower Qcrit11. In the implemented RCC designs 
these diffusions have separations of >300nm. 
In the results summarized in Tables 3 and 5 the control latch has 
the same size devices as those implemented in RCC devices. Howev-
er, storage node capacitances and diffusion areas are different due to 
differences in layout, and the addition of the dummy devices in 
RCC1. The SER reduction for just the capacitance and area changes 
is derived through SPICE simulations, and shown in the “no RCC” 
column. The SPICE simulation methodology has been described in 
detail before [36], and is not covered here. Low and high voltage 
measurements, and 90% CI are shown for measured data. 
TABLE 3. NEUTRON AND PROTON SER RATIO RESULTS FOR RCC 
TYPE DEVICES 
Device Vcc 
[V] 
Neutron 
measured 
SER  
reduction 
Neutron 
simulated 
SER 
reduction 
(no RCC)  
Proton measured SER  
reduction  
    27 MeV 198 MeV 
RCC1 0.7 3.8x ± 30% 1.2x 2.0x ± 10% 2.5x ± 10% 
RCC2 0.7 1.1x ± 30% 1.0x 1.1x ± 10% 1.3x ± 10% 
RCC1 1.0 NA  NA 3.2x ± 10% 
RCC2 1.0 NA  NA 1.3x ± 10% 
 
Heavy-Ion Testing Results 
Figure 11 depicts relative SER results for TC1 SEUT and RCC2 
devices as a function of LET. Error bars have been omitted for better 
readability (except for RCC2 devices). Unfortunately no RCC1 re-
sults are available at the time of writing of this paper. At high LETs, 
both RCC2 and SEUT upset rates are either equal or even worse than 
that of the non-hardened reference latch. We expect RCC1 devices to 
show a somewhat better performance than RCC2 ones, but the over-
all benefit in heavy ion dominated orbits (such as geosynchronous 
ones; see below) is expected to be worse than in terrestrial radiation 
environments. Clock node strikes again do not seem to contribute 
significantly to the overall soft error rate but at the highest LET val-
ues. RCC2 performance remains poor down to the lowest LET values 
investigated (2.8 MeV/(mg/cm2)). 
                                                                 
11 Such as N-P devices located on opposite sides of the RCC cross-
coupled devices (lower line in Figure 5) 
FIGURE 10.  VOLTAGE DEPENDENCE OF RELATIVE SER 
PERFORMANCE OF SEUT DEVICES UNDER HIGH-
ENERGY P+ IRRADIATION 
FIGURE 9.  RELATIVE P+ SER PERFORMANCE OF SEUT 
DEVICES IMPLEMENTED ON TC2. SER RESULTS ARE 
SHOWN FOR CS ONLY AND CS + CLOCK NODE UPSET 
MODES. 
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SER performance in geosynchronous orbits (100 mil of Alumi-
num shielding and solar quiet mode) has been estimated using 
Creme96 and results are summarized in Table 4 [37]. Please note that 
error bars are expected to be large12. Actual performance in orbit is 
likely worse than what is shown in Table 4, since only normal inci-
dence data have been collected, and work by Amusan et al show that 
those yield optimistic results [13]. Nevertheless, performance of the 
only tested RCC device (RCC2) is disappointing. It is speculated that 
even at low to moderate LET values sufficient charge is collected at 
distances that cover the separation of sensitive state weakening 
nodes. MCU data reported in reference [11] indicate average charge 
cloud dimensions in excess of 1μm at high LETs which is well 
beyond the separation of N-P diffusions (Qcrit impact see Figure 5) 
in the tested RCC flavor. 
TABLE 4. APPROXIMATE RELATIVE UPSET RATES IN GEOSYNCHRON-
OUS ORBITS (CREME96). CS + CLK NODE UPSET DATA APPLIED. 
Device SER -Ratios 
SEUT150 0.64 
SEUT800 0.04 
RCC2 2.14 
 
Alpha-particle Testing Results 
SEUT (Figure 12) as well as RCC1 results (Table 5) demonstrate 
that the alpha-particle SER contribution can be neglected for typical, 
modern ambient alpha-particle radiation environments and fluxes.  
Even for SEUT150 a reduction of the order of ~200x can be ex-
pected, versus ~2-3x for high-energy proton or neutron irradiation. 
For SEUT devices with node separations > 600nm no upsets have 
been observed even after weeks of continuous testing under accele-
rated alpha-particle flux conditions.  
                                                                 
12 We have not tried to estimate 90% confidence level values of the 
mean for all tested devices due to the complex convolution of raw 
data error bars with uncertainties in non-linear fitting parameters 
(Weibull parameters in Creme96). 
 
 
Alpha particle results for RCC1 and RCC2 are summarized in 
Table 5. The SER reduction relative to the non-RCC control latch on 
the same test chip is shown. The smaller separation between victim 
and reinforcing nodes in RCC1 results in a larger reduction com-
pared to RCC2. The SER improvements purely due to the RCC ef-
fect are relatively modest at lower voltages. Comparing the last two 
columns in Table 5 for RCC1 at 0.7V yields an approximately 2x 
SER reduction due to the RCC effect alone. However, in real world 
applications, the full 10.1x SER reduction will be seen, and this in-
cludes the impact of increased capacitance and area due to the addi-
tion of dummy devices in RCC1.  
TABLE 5. ALPHA-PARTICLE SER RATIO RESULTS FOR RCC TYPE 
DEVICES 
 Voltage [V] Measured SER 
reduction  
Simulated SER 
reduction due to 
capacitance, area 
changes only (no 
RCC) 
RCC1 0.7 10.1x ± 10% 5.0x 
RCC2 0.7 2.4x ± 10% 1.5x 
RCC1 1.0 57.0x 8.0x 
RCC2 1.0 4.0x 3.0x 
 
Technology Scaling Impact 
The measured SEU data discussed in the previous section demon-
strates that of the order of 30x SER reductions for SEUT devices and 
about 3x for RCC devices built in an advanced 32nm technology can 
be achieved with typical overheads of the order of 100% and 10%, 
respectively. We would like to emphasize that on the chip-level RCC 
might be more efficient than SEUT, despite the ~10x advantage in 
SER for SEUT devices.  This is best illustrated by a simple example. 
Let’s assume the RCC SER reduction is 3x at a 20% area cost (a 
rather conservative assumption), whereas it is 30x for a 100% area 
overhead in the case of SEUT. The design goal shall be a chip-level 
SER reduction of y FIT. How many RCC and SEUT latches 
(NRCCand NSEUT) are needed to achieve this goal and what are the 
involved area overheads?  
FIGURE 12.  ALPHA-PARTICLE INDUCED RELATIVE 
SER FOR TC2 SEUT DEVICES AT 0.7V. 
FIGURE 11.  HEAVY-ION SEUT AND RCC2 RESULTS 
(TC1) FOR CS ONLY AND CS + CLK NODE TESTING 
MODES.  
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where x denotes non-hardend device FIT/cell. Only ~50% more 
RCC devices (relative to SEUT devices) are needed to achieve a 
chip-level SER reduction of y FIT. However, the assumed area over-
head of RCC devices is 5x lower than for SEUT devices. Therefore, 
the overall chip-level area overhead is about 3x lower for RCC de-
vices in the above example.  
RCC fills the void where using SEUT would be over-kill. As long 
as there are other sources besides sequential elements contributing to 
the product SER13  there is limited ROI in making all sequential ele-
ments SEUT. A better approach that leads to lower overheads but 
comparable SER would be to protect only highly vulnerable sequen-
tial elements with SEUT, and convert others to RCC as needed 
Preserving the same absolute node separation and therefore SER 
benefit will be increasingly difficult and costly for SEUT type devic-
es as we continue to scale. This will translate into more hardened 
devices needed to achieve the same level of SER reduction in future 
semiconductor technologies at a similar area overhead cost. Since the 
SER benefit diminishes exponentially with node separation, a corres-
ponding larger number of hardened devices that rely on some form of 
local redundancy14 would be needed. For instance, assuming simple 
scaling of our 32nm SEUT800 devices, the device level SER is pro-
jected to increase by roughly 3x the next few technology generations 
under neutron or proton radiation15.     
For RCC type designs we also expect the SER benefit at constant 
cost to diminish somewhat with scaling. However, the rate at what 
this will occur is expected to be slower than for SEUT type devices. 
The main reason for the expected slower rate of diminishing returns 
for RCC devices is based on the fact that the separation of both, rein-
forcing and state weakening diffusions will decrease with scaling. As 
long as the SER contribution due to secondary victim nodes is rela-
tively small, technology scaling should to first order not impact the 
radiation robustness of this design technique (neglecting voltage 
scaling). In the extreme case when the impact of state weakening 
secondary victim nodes can be completely neglected, an improve-
ment in SER is even expected with scaling (again, ignoring Vcc scal-
ing). 
Both hardened mitigation techniques show diminishing returns as 
power supply voltages are scaled, further reducing the ROI of circuit-
level mitigation techniques discussed in this work.  
The authors of this work do not see radiation hardened sequential 
elements as mutually exclusive with other SER mitigation methods, 
but rather as complementing in logic structures where other tech-
niques such as parity or residue checking are not practical [18]. Plac-
ing hardened sequential elements offer a high degree of flexibility 
and if done correctly can yield good SER performance with little 
chip-level area and power tradeoffs. Although not addressed in this 
work, it is important to remember that an intelligent placement of 
hardened devices requires a solid architectural vulnerability factor 
(AVF) analysis of the structures of interest [18]. It would not make 
much sense to protect devices with very low AVF values. 
                                                                 
13 Such as combinational logic 
14 SEUT, BISER, DICE, circuit-level TMR, etc 
15 Assuming 0.7x scaling of distances per generation and no scaling 
in supply voltage (the latter assumption is very optimistic) 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
A novel circuit hardening technique called RCC (Reinforcing 
charge collection) is introduced. RCC exploits the fact that charge 
collection at state reinforcing nodes will increase Qcrit and hence 
reduce SER with respect to non-hardened devices of similar perfor-
mance and design targets.  
RCC devices and devices designed in a conventional local redun-
dancy technique (SEUT) have been implemented on two test chips 
built in a 32nm bulk CMOS process. The radiation robustness of 
both mitigation schemes was tested for several different radiation 
environments. Our results indicate that even for hardened devices 
manufactured in such an advanced technology, SER reduction levels 
of the order of 30x for SEUT devices and 3x for RCC type devices 
can be expected for terrestrial applications. Overheads of the imple-
mented designs are of the order of 100% for SEUT devices and 20% 
or less for RCC devices. 
We show that RCC devices despite their modest SER reduction of 
~3x, can be a more efficient mitigation technique on the chip-level. 
In space environments, SEUT devices are expected to fare much 
better than RCC based designs, however.  
For SEUT devices diminishing returns are expected as we contin-
ue to scale our technologies. A somewhat better scaling performance 
is predicted for RCC devices. The authors believe that in the short 
term redundancy hardened devices will continue to play an important 
role for protecting few important non-arrayed architectural state ele-
ments (with high architectural vulnerability [18]), whereas RCC is a 
better option for protecting large numbers of logic memory elements 
in random logic. However, with technology and voltage scaling, both 
mitigation techniques are projected to eventually become inadequate 
and too costly. 
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